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PROXY CONSENT TO PARTICIPATION OF THE
DECISIONALLY IMPAIRED IN MEDICAL RESEARCH
MARYLAND'S POLICY INITIATIVE
DIANE E. HOFFMANN, J.D., M.S.*
JACK ScHwARTz, J.D.**
I. INTRODUCTION
DO YOU HAVE A LOVED ONE WITH MEMORY LOSS?
RESEARCH TO FIND TREATMENTS FOR
ALZttE!MER'S DISEASE IS BEING CONDUCTED AT
The Innovative Clinical Research Center
Study participants will receive FREE medical care for
Alzheimer's disease, FREE memory assessment tests, FREE
study medication, and frequent monitoring....
To qualify for a research program, your loved one must:
e Have a responsible family member or other caregiver
who will attend study visits and ensure that study medi-
cation is properly taken
* Have symptoms of Alzheimer's disease-such as grad-
ually worsening short term memory, judgment, and
ability to perform daily activities
o Be in otherwise good health.
To learn about our studies, please contact ..
* Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Maryland School of Law. Professor
Hoffmann teaches a number of courses focusing on law and medicine. She has served on
several hospital and nursing home ethics committees, and is the Editor of the Mid-Atlantic
Ethics Committee Newsletter and co-author of A Handbook for Nursing Home Ethics Committees.
She was actively involved in the drafting and passage of the Maryland Health Care Deci-
sions Act. In 1994-1995, while on leave from the law school, she served as staff and then
acting director of the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Aging chaired by Maryland Senator
Barbara Mikulski.
** Chief Counsel, Division of Advice and Opinions, Maryland Office of the Attorney
General. Mr. Schwartz has chaired the Maryland Working Group on Conducting Research
on the Cognitively Impaired and is the prinicipal author of its reports and proposed
statute.
1. Advertisement, Do You Have a Loved One With Memoty Loss?, WASH. Posr, Oct. 6,
1996, at A22.
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This advertisement appeared in a Washington, D.C. area newspa-
per in the fall of 1996. It illustrates the demand for research subjects
who are "decisionally impaired"-that is, incapable of providing in-
formed consent to participation in medical research. The advertise-
ment suggests that "loved ones" may consent to participation in
medical research for those who are unable to consent themselves. Do
proxies have that authority? Should they? If the answer is yes, should
limits be placed on that authority, and what should those limits be?
This article discusses an effort in Maryland to answer these questions
and establish guidelines for research with those who lack decision-
making capacity.
II. CURRENT LEGAL UNCERTAINTY
A. Research-Specific Provisions
Federal regulations regarding research on human subjects pro-
vide for two fundamental safeguards: approval by an institutional re-
view board (IRB)2 and informed consent.3 The latter requirement
provides that "no investigator may involve a human being as a subject
in research covered by this policy unless the investigator has obtained
the legally effective informed consent of the subject or the subject's
legally authorized representative."4 The term "legally authorized rep-
resentative" is circuitously defined as "an individual or judicial or
other body authorized under applicable law to consent on behalf of a
prospective subject to the subject's participation in the procedure(s)
involved in the research."5 Apart from these provisions, federal regu-
lations provide little guidance or safeguards for the conduct of re-
search on decisionally impaired patients.6 In 1978, the former
Department of Health, Education and Welfare proposed regulations
that would have provided additional safeguards for research on indi-
viduals institutionalized as mentally disabled.7 However, these regula-
tions were abandoned in the face of sharp controversy, in particular
2. 45 C.F.R. § 46.103(b) (1996) (explaining that federal support for research involv-
ing human subjects will be provided only if the institution where the research is to be
conducted has certified that the research has been reviewed and approved by an IRB and
will be subject to continuing review by the IRB).
3. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (1996).
4. 1d
5. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(c) (1996).
6. The federal regulations do establish additional safeguards for research involving
fetuses, pregnant women and human in vitro fertilization, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.201-.211 (1996),
prisoners, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.301-.306 (1996), and children, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.401-.409 (1996),
but not for research on cognitively impaired individuals.
7. See 43 Fed. Reg. 53,954 (Nov. 17, 1978).
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the argument that they unfairly singled out the mentally ill and insti-
tutionalized for protections.8
Because federal law leaves unanswered the question of who is a
"legally authorized representative" for consent to research, research-
ers who seek to rely on this provision of federal law must turn to rele-
vant state law for guidance. Unfortunately, little, if any, state law
directly addresses this issue.
The little law that is available applies primarily to institutionalized
individuals and either prohibits incapacitated persons from participat-
ing in experimental research or significantly limits the circumstances
under which these individuals can participate in research.9 Most of
the statutes that address the issue require judicial approval or ap-
proval by a court-appointed guardian or conservator. For example,
California law allows for consent by a conservator, but "only for medi-
cal experiments related to maintaining or improving the health of the
subject or related to obtaining information about a pathological con-
dition of the subject."" ° A number of states require court approval
before a guardian or conservator may consent to participation in med-
8. See Jessica Wilen Berg, Legal and Ethical Complexities of Consent with Cognitively Im-
paired Research Subjects: Proposed Guidelines, 24J. L. MED. & ETHICS 18, 19 (1996); RichardJ.
Bonnie, Research with Cognitively Impaired Subjects: Unfinished Business in the Regulation of
Human Research, 54 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 105, 108 (1997).
9. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.830 (Michie 1996) (prohibiting experimental re-
search on state mental health patients that involve "any significant risk of physical or psy-
chological harm"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5175(0 (1995) (prohibiting any resident of a
state mental hospital from being approached "to participate in pharmaceutical research if
[the] patient is incapable of understanding the nature and consequences of [the] patient's
consent."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5174 (1995) (prohibiting certain classes of state
mental hospital residents, regardless of competency, from participating in pharmaceutical
research); MAss. REGs. CODE tit. 104, §§ 13.01-.05 (1995) (prohibiting research on patients
in mental facilities that will not provide direct, therapeutic benefit and prohibiting re-
search on patients with mental disabilities where the risk is more than minimal and ex-
ceeds the benefit to the subject); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 630.115(8) (West Supp. 1997)
(preventing state mental health patients from being "the subject of experimental re-
search," with exceptions, and prohibiting biomedical or pharmacological research from
being performed on any individual with mental disabilities if that research will have no
direct therapeutic benefit on the individual research subject).
10. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24175(b)(1) (West 1992) and CAL. PROB.
CODE § 2354 (West 1991) (permitting conservator of patient who has not been adjudicated
incompetent to consent to medical experimentation where patient does not object to par-
ticipation or where the conservator acts in good faith during a medical emergency); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24175(b) (2) (West 1992) and CAL. PROB. CODE § 2355(a) (West
1991) (permitting conservator of patient who has been adjudicated to lack the capacity to
give informed consent to consent even if the patient objects). In both provisions of the
California code, informed consent given by a person other than the human subject may
"only be for medical experiments related to maintaining or improving the health of the
human subject or related to obtaining information about a pathological condition of the
human subject." CAL. HEATH & SAFETY CODE § 24175(e) (West 1992).
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ical research by an individual lacking decision-making capacity, 1 and
the court must determine that the experimental treatment would be
in the "best interests" of the ward.1
A few state statutes permit the parent of a child with mental retar-
dation to consent to the child's participation in medical research,' 3
but generally statutes do not explicitly allow parents or other relatives
to consent to participation in medical research on behalf of a deci-
sionally impaired relative. Of the statutes that address the issue, none
appears to permit research on cognitively impaired individuals with
consent of a non-court-appointed proxy unless there are additional
safeguards. In some cases, a statute may appear to allow consent by a
non-court appointed representative with little oversight, but regula-
tions provide additional protections. For example, the Virginia
mental health statute states that an individual who is a patient or resi-
dent of a hospital or other facility operated, funded, or licensed by the
Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Substance
Abuse Services shall "[In] ot be the subject of experimental or investiga-
tional research without his prior written and informed consent or that
of his legally authorized representative."' 4 This law does not define
"legally authorized representative" and appears to provide little in the
way of protections for institutionalized individuals lacking decision-
making capacity. However, regulations promulgated under the stat-
ute provide that "[n]on-therapeutic research using patients or resi-
dents within an institution [for the mentally ill or mentally retarded]
is forbidden unless it is determined by the research review committee
11. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-677(e) (West Supp. 1997) (providing that a
guardian may only consent to experimental biomedical or behavioral medical procedure
or participation in any behavioral experiment "if it is intended to preserve the life or pre-
vent serious impairment of the physical health of the ward or it is intended to assist the
ward to regain his abilities and has been approved for that person by the court").
12. 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-110 (West 1993) (providing that parent or guardian
cannot consent to ward's participation in any "unusual, hazardous, or experimental serv-
ices" without approval by court and a determination that such services are in the "best
interests" of the ward); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.56(3)(4)(a), (b) (West Supp. 1997)
(prohibiting a guardian or conservator from giving consent to experimental treatment of
any kind unless the procedure is first approved by the court, which must determine if the
procedure is in the "best interests" of the ward); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:25(I)(c)-(e)
(1995) (establishing that court can authorize guardian to consent to experimental treat-
ment only after ensuring that such treatment is in the "best interest" of the ward).
13. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 393.13(4) (c)(6) (West Supp. 1997) (explaining that mentally
retarded patient may provide required consent if competent; otherwise parents or legal
guardian may do so); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 25-5-132 (Michie 1997) (a resident of a state insti-
tution for the mentally retarded has the right to refuse to be subjected to experimental
medical or psychological research unless the research is authorized by a court, his guard-
ian, or his parent or guardian ad litem if the resident is a minor).
14. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.1-84.1 (Michie 1996).
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that such non-therapeutic research will not present greater than mini-
mal risk."15
Perhaps the most ambitious effort to set standards for research
on decisionally impaired individuals has been that of New York State.
New York public health statutes provide that each public or private
institution or agency that conducts human research "shall establish a
human research review committee."6 The consent of the committee
and the Commissioner of the Department of Health are required for
all research "involving minors, incompetent persons, mentally dis-
abled persons, and prisoners.""7 Additionally, regulations adopted by
the New York State Office of Mental Health set forth procedures to be
followed for the participation of human subjects who lacked the ca-
pacity to provide informed consent or who were minors in potentially
high-risk research involving mental illness." However, the regula-
tions were struck down at the trial court level as invalid and unen-
forceable because they were found to be inconsistent with the state
statute requiring the Commissioner of the Department of Health to
consent to all research involving children and incompetent adults. 9
15. 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE 5-20-40 (Michie 1997).
16. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 2444 (McKinney 1996).
17. Id.
18. N.Y. COMp. Coras R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 527.10 (1995). These' regulations required
that before an IRB approve research on this group, it ensure that (1) "[r]isks to subjects
(be] reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits ... to patients, and the importance of
the knowledge that [would] reasonably be expected to result" § 527.10 (d)(4)(ii); (2) "the
study could not be carried out without the involvement of the incapable subjects," and that
if the research "involved more than .minimal risk and/or invasive procedures" that the
project be "likely to produce knowledge which has overriding therapeutic importance for
the understanding or treatment of a condition which is presented by the patient in ques-
tion." § 527.10(d) (6). The regulations further set forth detailed requirements for disclo-
sure of information to the patient or his representative regarding the risks and benefits of
the research. § 527.10(e)(I). Of most significance was that the regulations provided that if
a patient lacked capacity to consent to participation in a research study, consent could be
obtained from "(a) an individual appointed pursuant to a duly executed durable power of
attorney specifying the authority to consent or withhold consent to participation in re-
search; or (b) an individual designated by the patient to consent or withhold consent to
the patient's participation .... ." § 527.10(e) (2) (iii).
The regulations further specified that the individual designated by the patient may
not be "a current employee, servant or agent of the facility and may not be affiliated with
the research project." Id. If an individual does not designate a person to consent on his or
her behalf, the regulations provided that consent could be obtained from "the patient's
spouse, parent, adult child, adult sibling, guardian or a committee of the person which is
authorized to consent to research" and that in the absence of a person from this list con-
sent could be obtained from "a close friend or a court of competent jurisdiction."
§ 527.10(e) (2) (iv).
19. See T.D. v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 626 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1995); affd 650 N.Y.S.2d 173 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996), appeal dismissed by 680 N.E.2d 617
(N.Y. 1997), leave to appeal granted by 684 N.E.2d 281 (N.Y. 1997). See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw
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In a subsequent decision, an appellate court agreed with this
finding, but took a step further by also holding that the regulations
adopted by the New York State Office of Mental Health failed to pro-
vide for adequate notice to potential subjects, failed to include review
procedures regarding a determination that the subject lacked deci-
sion-making capacity, and therefore violated the due process clauses
of both the New York Constitution2 ° and the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution.2 The court also held that the regu-
lations violated New York common law and two other state statutes.
The court stated that for regulations of this kind to meet constitu-
tional standards, they must "at the very least, contain appropriate and
specific provisions for notice to the potential subject that his or her
capacity is being evaluated and for appropriate administrative and ju-
dicial review of a determination regarding capacity."22 The court ex-
plained that a constitutional analysis of the regulations was justified
because the Commissioner of Health would be likely to issue new reg-
ulations governing human subjects research in response to the court's
invalidation of the regulations issued by the Commissioner of Mental
Health.2"
Without clear statutory guidance on this issue, investigators in
most states who wish both to perform research on decisionally im-
paired individuals and to have secure legal protection would need to
seek approval from the courts, probably by means of appointment of a
guardian who would be authorized to make such decisions. This pro-
cedural requirement derives from the state's historical role of parens
patriae, protecting incompetent individuals and ensuring that deci-
sions for their care are made consistently with their best interests. At
least one court has come to this conclusion. In Kaimowitz v. Michigan
§ 2444, subdiv. 2 (McKinney 1985) (where subject is an incompetent person, mentally dis-
abled person, minor, or prisoner, consent of subject, institution's human research review
committee and the Commissioner of Health must be obtained). Plaintiffs in the case were
.patients involuntarily hospitalized at various psychiatric facilities in New York State subject
to supervision by the [Office of Mental Health]" who had been adjudicated incapable of
giving consent to medical treatment and subsequently were given "beneficial medication
over their objection." 626 N.Y.S.2d at 1017. These patients brought suit on their own
behalf and on behalf of all patients in New York State psychiatric facilities out of concern
that under the existing regulations promulgated by the Office of Mental Health, they
could be forced "to participate in research, as subjects, without their consent." Id.
20. N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 6.
21. See T.D. v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 626 N.Y.S. 2d 1015 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1995), affd 650 N.Y.S.2d 173 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996), appeal dismissed by 680 N.E.2d 617
(N.Y. 1997), leave to appeal granted by 684 N.E.2d 281 (N.Y. 1997).
22. Id. at 187.
23. See i at 185.
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Department of Mental Health,2 4 the court held that "experimental psy-
chosurgery" could not legally be performed on a mentally incompe-
tent person even if a surrogate decision-maker, in this case the
patient's family, consented. 25
In practice, researchers'who seek the participation of decisionally
impaired individuals in medical research have relied informally on
family consent in these circumstances, rather than routinely, or even
occasionally, seeking appointment of a guardian. This practice of re-
lying on family consent finds historical support. For example, the
Declaration of Helsinki included in its principles the following:
"Where physical or mental incapacity makes it impossible to obtain
informed consent, or when the subject is a minor, permission from
the responsible relative replaces that of the subject in accordance with
national legislation." 26
Researchers' reluctance to seek judicial approval may in part be
based on a belief that such procedures are unnecessary or too time-
consuming and costly. Apparently, researchers have generally as-
sumed that the approval of an IRB is sufficient to allow surrogate con-
sent to the participation of incapacitated patients in a research
protocol. One successful lawsuit within a state will prove this assump-
tion wrong, with potentially devastating consequences for research
conducted in that state to combat psychiatric and cognitive disorders.
For example, the result of the court decision in T.D. v. New York State
Office of Mental Health,27 may significantly limit research in New York
on institutionalized individuals who are cognitively impaired. Based
upon the appellate court opinion, residents in a New York State facil-
ity operated or licensed by the Office of Mental Health who lack deci-
sion-making capacity may not be subjects in any (non-federally
funded) research determined to be "non-therapeutic" and to pose a
greater than minimal risk unless the individual (prior to incapacity)
gave "specific consent or designated a suitable surrogate from whom
such consent" could be obtained. 8 Moreover, orders issued by the
24. 42 U.S.L.W. 2063 (Cir. Ct. Wayne Cty., Mich., 1973).
25. 1 MENTAL DIsABILrrv L. REP. 147 (1976); see also State Court Bars Experimental Brain
Surgery, 2 PRISON L. REP. 433, 475 (1973).
26. Declaration of Helsinki (1948), reprinted in Council for International Organizations
of Medical Sciences, INTERNATIONAL ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH IN-
VOLVING HUMAN BEINGS 47 (1993). The statement appears to assume the potential for
national legislation allowing relatives to consent to participation in research of an incapaci-
tated individual.
27. T.D. v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 626 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1995), affd 650 N.Y.S.2d 173 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996), appeal dismissed by 680 N.E.2d 617 (N.Y.
1997), leave to appeal granted by 684 N.E.2d 281 (N.Y. 1997).
28. T.D., 650 N.Y.S.2d at 177.
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trial court after its opinion, 29 and a stipulation of the parties entered
into prior to the appellate court decision, further stated that such resi-
dents may not be subjects of non-federally funded therapeutic research
that is of greater than minimal risk without court authorization or un-
less the individual prior to incapacity had consented to the research
or had appointed a proxy with authorization to consent to the
research.°
While the appellate decision stated explicitly that". . . the large
majority of studies, which are therapeutic and/or proceed upon the
informed consent of subjects or are Federally funded, will remain un-
affected,"'" issues on appeal in the case include whether the restric-
tions on non-federally funded research should apply to federally
funded research and whether there should be additional due process
protections in place for therapeutic research conducted with residents
in facilities operated or licensed by the Office of Mental Health who
lack decision-making capacity.3 2
B. Medical Treatment Statutes
While most states do not have laws that expressly address consent
to conduct research with decisionally impaired patients, during the
past two decades, most states have passed statutes that allow individu-
als to consent to receipt of medical treatment on behalf of another
who is cognitively impaired. These proxy consent laws are of two
types: "durable power of attorney (DPA) for health care" statutes and
"surrogate" statutes. A handful of states, including Maryland, have en-
acted comprehensive statutes incorporating both guidelines for the
execution of advance directives and standards for surrogate health
29. See 626 N.Y.S.2d 1015, No. 5136/91 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1996) (order to show cause
with temporary restraining order).
30. See also 626 N.Y.S.2d 1015, No. 5136/91 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 9, 1996). Therapeutic re-
search is defined as research "for which an Institutional Review Board has determined that
the research holds out a prospect of direct benefit and is important to the health or well
being of the patient and is only available in the context of the research." Id. at 10-11. Non-
therapeutic research was defined as "all research which is not therapeutic research as that
term was defined...." Id.
31. TD., 650 N.Y:S.2d at 177.
32. See 650 N.Y.S.2d 1015, No. 5136/91 (App. Div. 1996) (notice of motion for leave to
appeal; support of motion for leave to appeal; grant of motion to appeal).
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care decision-making for incapacitated individuals."3 In Maryland the
law is referred to as the Health Care Decisions Act.3 4
DPA statutes allow a competent individual to execute a document
appointing an "agent" to make health care decisions for the individual
in the event that he or she becomes incapacitated." . The agent's au-
thority is generally defined by the individual in the DPA itself 36
In many states, surrogate consent statutes apply when no agent
has been appointed. 7 These statutes typically allow a family member
to make medical decisions for an incapacitated patient based on an
assessment of what the patient would have wanted (a substituted judg-
ment standard) or, if that preference cannot be inferred, based upon
the patient's best interests.38 Surrogate statutes generally include a
priority ranking of those authorized to make decisions, usually begin-
ning with a person's spouse, followed by adult children, then parents
and adult siblings.39 Some statutes go further down the family chain,
and a few include a "close friend" in the list
4  I
These statutes, however, do not explicitly address consent to par-
ticipation in medical research. The laws generally limit the authority
of the agent or surrogate to decisions regarding health care or medi-
cal treatment. However, only a few states define the terms "health
care" or "medical treatment" in their durable power of attorney for
health care and surrogate consent statutes."1 In Maryland, the Health
33. These states include Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Kentucky, Maine,
Maryland, New Mexico, Oregon, and Virginia. See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to -
3262 (West 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-43 (1993) and §§ 19a-570 to -575(1993); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2517 (1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.101-.401 (West 1994); Ky.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 311.621-.643 (Michie Supp. 1994); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18A, §§ 5-
801 to -817 (West 1995); Mo. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 5-601 to -608 (1994); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 24-7A-1 to -18 (Michie 1995); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 127.505-.640 (1993); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 54.1-2981 to -2993 (Michie Supp. 1992).
34. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-602 (1994).
35. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-602 (1994).
36. See ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE § 12.22, at 164-65 (2d ed. 1995).
37. See id. § 14.4, at 253.
38. See id. § 14.8, at 263-66. While virtually all states have a DPA statute, only about two-
thirds have surrogate decision-making laws. See Diane E. Hoffmann, et al., How Close is
Enough? Family Relationships and Attitudes Toward Advance Directives and Life Sustaining Treat-
ments, 3J. ETHICS, LAW & AGIcN 5, 18 ("As of January, 1996, 32 states and the District of
Columbia had statutes authorizing family members to make medical treatment decisions
for an incapacitated relative based on the patient's wishes or his or her best interests.").
39. See MEISEL, supra note 36 § 14.4, at 254. In states that lack such statutes, case law
generally authorizes family members to make health care decisions for incapacitated pa-
tients. See Hoffmann et. al., supra note 38, at 19.
40. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., H.ALTH-GEN. § 5-605(a) (2) (vi) (1994).
41. See, e.g., ANN. CAL. PROB. CODE § 4942 (West Supp. 1997) (defining "health care" as
.any care, treatment, service, or procedure to maintain, diagnose, or treat an individual's
physical or mental condition"); see also GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-36-1 et. seq. (Supp. 1997) (de-
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Care Decisions Act 42 does not define health care; however, the Mary-
land Attorney General's Office stated in an opinion letter that the
term "health care" would be synonymous with "a procedure or course
of treatment that relates to the disease state of the particular pa-
tient."4" Thus, as long as the research being contemplated involves
potential benefit, that is, "as long as there is an articulable link be-
tween the research and a possible improvement in the patient's condi-
tion, then a 'health care' decision is possible, and the patient's
hypothesized wishes would be the basis for it."4 4
In each state, determining whether the health care decision-mak-
ing laws encompass research will require attention to the specific defi-
nition of health care in the statutes or to an inference from the other
parts of the statutes to determine whether they should be interpreted
to apply to any type of research, potentially therapeutic or otherwise.
The opinion letter by the Maryland Office of the Attorney General
may be the first authority to interpret the application of a DPA or
surrogate decision-making statute to consent to participation in re-
search. The letter states that Maryland's law "does not authorize an
agent or surrogate to consent to a protocol that is expected to have no
present or future therapeutic effect on the patient. Even an advance
directive that generally consents to participation in future research
cannot authorize an agent's or surrogate's decision that is unrelated
to potential therapeutic effect on the patient."45 According to the At-
torney General, while "altruism is noble,.. . it is not 'health care.'- 46
In the TD. case, the defendants argued that the limitations in
New York state law on surrogate decision-making for withholding of
life-sustaining treatment 47 would not apply to surrogate consent for
participation in research for a cognitively impaired individual because
the decision to participate in research would not lead to a patient's
death. 48 New York state has one of the nation's most restrictive rules
regarding surrogate consent to termination or withholding of life-sus-
fining "health care" as "any care, treatment, service or procedure to maintain, diagnose,
treat or provide for the patient's physical or mental health or personal care").
42. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 5-601 et. seq.
43. Opinion Letter fromJack Schwartz, Chief Counsel for Opinions and Advice, Office
of the Maryland Attorney General (July 26, 1996) [hereinafter "Opinion Letter"] (on file
with the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy).
44. Id. at 2.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGs. tit. 14, § 527.10 (1995).
48. T.D. v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 650 N.Y.S.2d 173 (N.Y. App. Div.
1996), appeal dismissed by 680 N.E.2d 617 (N.Y. 1997), leave to appeal granted by 684 N.E.2d
281 (N.Y. 1997).
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tamining treatment from a patient who lacks decision-making capacity.
In the majority of states that have surrogate consent statutes, surro-
gates may consent to termination of life support if it would be consis-
tent with what the patient would have wanted, or if that cannot be
determined, if it would be in the patient's best interests.49 In New
York, the law, as defined through court opinions, prohibits a surro-
gate from making a decision to withhold or terminate life-sustaining
treatment from an incapacitated patient unless there is "clear and
convincing evidence" the patient, when competent, had provided in-
structions to have treatment terminated should he be irreversibly ill.50
The case law does not allow the withholding or withdrawing of life-
sustaining treatment based on a best interest test." Thus, the defend-
ant in T.D. argued that the surrogate consent law regarding termina-
tion of life support should not apply in the research context as that
law is too restrictive. The court rejected the defendant's argument as
"unpersuasive with regard to... greater than minimal risk non-thera-
peutic studies." 2 Rather, the court stated that "similar substantive
and procedural safeguards should be provided to these potential re-
search subjects as is provided to patients in life-sustaining treatment
settings."5"
At least one prestigious body has advocated that the framework
used in many states for clinical decision-making for decisionally im-
paired individuals be applied to decisions regarding their participa-
tion in research. A position paper by the American College of
Physicians .concludes that individuals should be able to consent
through an advance directive to participation in research at a future
time when they may be "cognitively impaired." 4 If an individual has
not execute d such a directive, the position paper states that a legally
authorized [surrogate should be able to consent to certain research
protocols, using a mixed substituted judgment and best interest test.-5
49. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
50. See Matter of Westchester County Medical Center, 72 N.Y.2d 517 (N.Y. 1988); see
also People v. Eulo, 472 N.E.2d 286 (N.Y. 1984).
51. No appellate court in the state has allowed the use of a best interest test, however,
there is a trial court opinion in which the best interest test was applied. See In re Beth
Israel Medical Center, 519 N.Y.S.2d 511 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987).
52. T.D., 650 N.Y.2d at 191.
53. Id.
54. American College of Physicians, Cognitively Impaired Subjects, 111 ANNALS OF INTER.
NAL MED. 843 (1989).
55. Id at 844.
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III. THE IARYLAND POLICY INITIATIVE
A. Identifying the Issues
In light of uncertainty about the authority of agents and surro-
gates in Maryland to consent to participation in research on behalf of
decisionally impaired individuals, as well as the strong and differing
views expressed by some researchers and advocates, the Maryland At-
torney General's Office established what was called a "Working
Group" to begin a dialogue on the issue. The Working Group con-
sisted of approximately 15 individuals, including lawyers, ethicists, re-
searchers from academic and government institutions, and advocates
for the mentally ill.
The Working Group held its first meeting in May, 1995. By the
end of the meeting, the group had set its priorities to include the
following:
1. To address the circumstances under which an individual
with present decisional capacity might give a legally and
ethically valid consent to participation in research, at a
time of future decisional incapacity, through an advance
directive.
2. To explore whether, under carefully limited circum-
stances, a legally and ethically valid consent to participa-
tion in research might be obtained by a proxy (health
care agent or surrogate decision-maker) for a research
subject who never had decisional capacity or who had
lost decisional capacity before expressing any views
about participation in research.56
In considering these issues, the Working Group was free to con-
sider whatever changes in the law were thought desirabli to adapt it to
the research setting. Indeed, there was considerable initial agreement
among Working Group members that the Maryland Health Care Deci-
sions Act would best serve as an initial framework for approaching the
issue of proxy consent to participation in research involving the deci-
sionally impaired. In its present form, however, the law did not pro-
vide sufficient safeguards if it were to be adapted as an inclusive
mechanism for consent to research participation.
Courts and legislatures have required additional safeguards for
other types of surrogate decision-making for individuals lacking deci-
56. Letter from Jack Schwartz, Chief Counsel for Opinions and Advice, Office of the
Maryland Attorney General to Diane Hoffmann, ASSL Professor, University of Maryland,
School of Law (May 31, 1995) (on file with the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy). "
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sion-making capacity." Unlike cases involving refusal of life-sus-
taining treatment, where courts have deferred to families and placed
very few limits on their decisions to terminate life support for a close
relative, courts and legislatures have generally required safeguards
such as judicial approval in cases involving a decision by a surrogate to
* sterilize or administer psychotropic medications to a mentally incapac-
itated individual. 58 While the Working Group did not agree this level
of procedural protection was required for decision-making for partici-
pation in research, the reasons for additional protection in the re-
search context appeared justified by similar considerations to their
need in decisions regarding sterilization and the administration of
psychotropic drugs, including:
1) a history of abusive decision-making in these areas;
57. See Philip M. Bein, Surrogate Consent and the Incompetent Experimental Subject, 46 FOOD
DRUG COSMETIC L.J. 739 (1991)..
58. Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986) (holding that in situations where the
state's police power is not implicated and a patient refuses to consent to the administration
of antipsychotic drugs, there must be a judicial determination of whether the patient has
the capacity to make a reasoned decision with respect to proposed treatment before the
drugs may be administered pursuant to the state's parens patriae power). See, e.g., People v.
Medina, 705 P.2d 961 (Colo. 1985) (en banc) (holding that antipsychotic medicine may be
administered to a nonconsenting mentally ill patient incapable of making an informed
treatment decision only after the trial court conducts a full and fair adversarial hearing; the
court must be satisfied by clear and convincing evidence that the patient is incompetent,
that treatment by antipsychotic medicine is necessary, that a less intrusive treatment alter-
native is not available, and that the patient's need for treatment by antipsychotic medicine
is sufficiently compelling to override any bona fide and legitimate interest of patient in
refusing treatment); In the Matter of Moe, 432 N.E.2d 712 (Mass. 1982) (concluding that a
guardian must obtain a proper judicial order for sterilization of an incompetent ward
before he or she can validly consent to it; guardians and parents cannot consent to the
sterilization of a ward in their care or custody); In re Guardianship of Roe, Ill, 421 N.E.2d
40 (Mass. 1981) (holding that if an incompetent individual refuses antipsychotic drugs,
those charged with his protection must seek judicial determination of substituted judg-
ment); In the Matter of Grady, 426 A.2d 467 (N.J. 1981) (holding that an appropriate
court must make final determination whether consent to sterilization should be given on
behalf of incompetent individual).
Most courts have required that a judicial decision regarding the competency of the
individual be made prior to a surrogate decision, and, in some cases, have insisted that the
court make the decision for the surrogate or approve the surrogate's decision. See Rogers
v. Commissioner of the Dept. of Mental Health et. aL, 458 N.E.2d 308 (Mass. 1983) (hold-
ing that an involuntarily committed mental patient must be adjudicated incompetent by a
judge in order to be deprived of the ability to make his or her own treatment decisions,
and if a patient is adjudicated incompetent, a judge, using a substituted judgment stan-
dard, must decide whether the patient would have consented to the administration of an-
tipsychotic drugs); Keyhea v. Rushen, 178 Cal.App.3d 526 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (holding
that prisoners are entitled to judicial determination of their competency to refuse treat-
ment before they can be subjected to long-term involuntary psychotropic medication).
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2) the courts' concern that the family or institution seeking
such treatments may possess interests which conflict
with the patient's; and
3) the intrusive nature of the treatments and their adverse
risk to future health or family life.59
These factors may also play a role in medical research on human
subjects. According to one author, medical research on incapacitated
individuals deserves heightened scrutiny and more stringent stan-
dards for a number of reasons:
First, the history of medical experimentation has been char-
acterized by significant incidents of abuse, particularly where
members of vulnerable populations have been enlisted as
subjects. Second, the interest of medical researchers in se-
curing participation in the experiment often conflicts with
their duties as treating physicians to inform, advise, and act
in the best interest of their patients. Third, experimentation
is inherently intrusive and dangerous, as the nature and mag-
nitude of risks involved are largely unknown and
unknowable.6"
The court in T.D. clearly agreed that there is a similarity between the
administration of psychotropic and antipsychotic drugs to incapaci-
tated patients and the use of cognitively impaired patients in medical
research. In fact, the court stated explicitly that
practices for assessing capacity and obtaining consent for
such experimentation must, at the very least, provide the
same safeguards to the constitutional and common law rights
of the incapable patients, who may be potential subjects of
these experiments, as provided to patients over whose objec-
tion treating physicians seek to administer, solely for thera-
peutic purposes, medications, that can cause similar side-
effects. I
The current climate of medical research in particular lends credibility
to an argument that additional safeguards are necessary for research
on the decisionally impaired:
The 1980s witnessed an unprecedented marriage of science
and entrepreneurship. During that decade researchers be-
gan holding financial interests in companies whose products
59. See Bein, supra note 57, at 751-52.
60. Id. at 747-48.
61. T.D. v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 650 N.Y.S.2d 173 (N.Y. App. Div.
1996), appeal dismissed by 680 N.E.2d 617 (N.Y. 1997), leave to appeal granted by 684 N.E.2d
281 (N.Y. 1997).
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they were studying. This practice has created new conflicts
for researchers. Where a company developing experimental
products is a fledgling start-up enterprise with few existing
markets, its stock price usually reflects expectations regard-
ing research on the new products. Rapid disclosure of suc-
cessful research results would enable early Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) approval and higher share prices
often resulting in a windfall to the researcher with a financial
interest. Conversely, a researcher holding a financial inter-
est in the company would have strong incentives not to dis-
close information which might suggest the product is
ineffective or unsafe.6"
Against this background, the Working Group proceeded to consider
the types of additional safeguards that were necessary in the research
context. Initial questions articulated by the group included the
following:
1. If an individual authorizes an agent to consent to the in-
dividual's participation in medical research protocols,
should the law impose limits on the agent's authority, or
should the agent be trusted to make a decision consis-
tent with the individual's wishes? If limitations are ap-
propriate, what should they be?
2. Should an agent be authorized to consent to an incapaci-
tated individual's participation in medical research if the
individual has not expressly given this authorization in
the DPA? Should the standard DPA form include the
authority of the agent to consent to the individual's par-
ticipation in medical research:
a) that holds out the potential for direct benefit to the
individual?
b) that holds out no potential for direct benefit to the
individual but that may ultimately benefit others?
Should an agent's ability to consent be based on the
level of risk associated with the proposed research?
3. Should a surrogate (not legally appointed by the individ-
ual) be able to consent to the individual's participation
in medical research:
a) that holds out the potential for direct benefit to the
individual?
62. Bein, supra note 57, at 758.
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b) that holds out no potential for direct benefit to the
individual but that may ultimately benefit others?
What criteria or limitations, if any, should be placed on
the surrogate's decision-making authority? Should a sur-
rogate's authority to consent depend on the level of risk
associated with the proposed research?
4. In either case, agent or surrogate, should the criteria for
proxy consent to participation of an incapacitated indi-
vidual in medical research that does not hold out the
potential for direct benefit to the individual ever go be-
yond substituted judgment (i.e., be based on factors
other than the individual's wishes?)
5. Is it ever appropriate to allow surrogate consent for a
never-capacitated individual to participate in medical re-
search that holds out no potential for direct benefit to
the individual?
6. Is it ever appropriate to honor the wishes of an individ-
ual written in an advance directive to participate in med-
ical research that is likely to benefit others, whether or
not the research holds out the potential for direct bene-
fit to the individual, if the individual has not appointed
an agent and has no legal surrogate?
These questions, based largely on the state Health Care Decisions Act,
combined with concepts incorporated into the federal regulations for
research on human subjects to form the basis of the Working Group's
deliberations.
The Working Group presumed that the federal regulatory stan-
dards were applicable to federally funded research. The Working
Group recognized that some elements of federal regulations-for ex-
ample, the concept of "minimal risk"-are subject to debate.6" How-
ever, the Working Group concluded that it had neither the mandate
nor the resources to address perceived deficiencies in federal law,
apart from the regulatory gap concerning decisionally impaired sub-
jects. Therefore, the Group's recommendations reflected the con-
cepts and categories embodied in federal law.
63. The federal regulations define minimal risk as risks where "the probability and
magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the research are not greater in and among
themselves than those normally encountered in daily life or during the performance of
routine physical or psychological examinations or tests." 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(i) (1996).
Some difficulties with the concept of "minimal risk" are explored in Benjamin Freedman
et al., In Loco Parentis: Minimal Risk as an Ethical Threshold for Research upon Children, 23
HASTINGS CENTER REp.13 (1993).
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In addition, the Working Group did not explore the important
and difficult issue of a researcher's assessment of a potential subject's
capacity to give informed consent-in particular, the researcher's pro-
cess of deciding that an individual with a psychiatric disorder is never-
theless capable of giving ethically valid consent.64 The Working
Group's recommendations proceeded from the assumption that, in
every category addressed by the Working Group, the potential re-
search subject is not capable of giving informed consent to participa-
tion in a research protocol at the time of potential enrollment.65
B. Framing Recommendations on Proxy Consent
The Working Group organized its discussion and preliminary rec-
ommendations by reference to five factual "scenarios."66 These scena-
rios differed in terms of the situation of the now-incapacitated
individual- for example, whether the individual had executed a DPA
and, if not, whether a surrogate for the individual is available.67
Within each scenario, the Working Group considered research proto-
cols with different levels of risks and potential benefits.68 After an op-
portunity for public comment, the Working Group issued a draft
statute reflecting its preliminary policy recommendations.69
Scenario A: Consent by health care agent-DPA refers to research
participation
This scenario involves an individual who, when able to under-
stand the nature of the action, gave broad written authority for the
individual's health care agent to consent not only to health care, but
64. Among the accounts describing concerns in this area, see Paul S. Appelbaum et al.,
The Therapeutic Misconception: Informed Consent in Psychiatric Research, 5 INT'LJ. L. & PSYCHIA-
TRY 319 (1982); Paul R. Benson et al., Informed Consent in Psychiatric Research: Preliminary
Findingsfrom an Ongoing Investigation, 20 Soc. Sci. MED. 1331 (1985); PhilipJ. Candilis et
al., A Survey of Researchers Using a Consent Policy for Cognitively Impaired Human Research Sub-
jects, 15 IRB: A REVIEW OF HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH 1 (1993); Evan G. DeRenzo, The Ethics
-of Involving Psychiatrically Impaired Persons in Research, IRB: A REVIEW OF HUMAN SUBJECTS
REsEARCH 7 (1994).
65. The Working Group's recommendations on subjects' assent indirectly address con-
cerns about an erroneous conclusion that an individual is incapable of giving informed
consent. See infra text accompanying notes 83-85.
66. Jack Schwartz, Initial Report of the Attorney General's Research Working Group 7-
15 (Oct. 8, 1996) (unpublished report on file with the Attorney General's Research Work-
ing Group).
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. Jack Schwartz, Second Report of the Attorney General's Research Working Group
(May 5, 1997) [hereinafter Second Report] (the Second Report is reprinted in the appen-
dix to this issue of the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy).
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also to the individual's participation in research. DPAs that refer spe-
cifically to research participation are presendy rare, if not nonexis-
tent. However, if state law recognized this use of an advance directive,
presumably some people would want to include such a provision in
their advance directives.7" Therefore, the Working Group considered
whether the law should authorize consent by the health care agent
under these circumstances, for particular types of research protocols.
* Type of protocol: No greater than minimal risk.
" Working Group recommendations: Authorize the agent to consent
if the agent concludes that the individual would have wanted to
participate in the particular protocol, even if the investigator
can identify no reasonable prospect of direct benefit to the
individual.
For this first type of protocol, consensus was easily reached. The
DPA reflects an atypical interest in research participation. The indi-
vidual also selected a health care agent to further that interest, and
the agent may be presumed to have been chosen because of the
agent's familiarity with the individual's character and values. Thus,
deference is owed to the agent'sjudgment that the particular protocol
is one that the individual would have wished to support through par-
ticipation. The individual's interest in self-determination, the Work-
ing Group believed, deserves respect even after the loss of decisional
capacity. In this situation, autonomy interests are at their highest, and
the low risk of the protocol minimizes concerns that arise from the
principle of nonmaleficence.71
* Type ofprotocol: Greater than minimal risk, reasonable prospect
of direct medical benefit to the individual.
• Working Group recommendation: Authorize the agent to consent if
the agent concludes that participation would be in the individ-
ual's medical best interest, unless there is reason to believe that
the individual would not have wanted to participate in the par-
ticular protocol.
The characterization of research in terms of its potential for di-
rect medical benefit to the research subject reflects distinctions drawn
in the federal regulations. For example, the IRB is to determine
whether the risks to the research subject "are reasonable in relation to
70. See Rebecca Dresser, Mentally Disabled Research Subjects: The Enduring Policy Issues, 276
JAMA 67, 70 (1996).
71. See THOMAS L. BEAUCHAMP &JAMSEs F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDIcAL ETHICS
189-94 (4th ed. 1994).
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anticipated benefits, if any ... "72 The Belmont Report asserts that
"[r]esearch and practice may be carried on together when research is
designed to evaluate the safety and efficacy of a therapy.""3 Because
participation in research having the potential for direct medical bene-
fit involves "health care," as that term is used in the Health Care Deci-
sions Act, the Working Group's preliminary recommendation
amounted to maintaining the legal status quo.
* Type of protocol: Greater than minimal risk, no reasonable pros-
pect of direct medical benefit to the individual.
" Working Group recommendation: Authorize the agent to consent
if the agent concludes that the individual would have wanted to
participate in the particular protocol and either of the follow-
ing conditions is met: the protocol involves no more than a
minor increase over minimal risk,"4 or if the protocol involves
more than a minor increase over minimal risk, a knowledgea-
ble person from outside the research team (for example, a
member of an institution's ethics committee) confirms that the
agent understands the goals and risks of the protocol.
This type of protocol poses the greatest threat to vulnerable sub-
jects because it not only holds out no hope of personal benefit, but
also exposes the subject to risks beyond those ordinarily encountered.
Yet, the research-specific advance directive that is envisioned here
marks the clearest possible statement of personal choice. Respect for
persons implies respect for self-determination.
There was initial agreement among Working Group members
that, at a minimum, the state should allow an agent to consent if the
individual had given express authorization for participation in this
type of research and the research would involve no more than a minor
increase over minimal risk. The issue for the Working Group was
whether to go beyond this. Some members felt strongly that agents in
this situation should not be so restricted and that there should be a
mechanism to allow an agent to consent to participation in research
for a decisionally impaired individual, even if the research involved a
72. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(2) (1996); see also, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 46.405 (1996) (referring
to research "that holds out the prospect of direct benefit for the individual subject").
73. NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL
AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR
THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH 4 (1979). Some commentators reject
the distinction, however. See, e.g., Nancy M. P. King, Experimental Treatment: Oxymoron or
Aspiration?, 25 HAsriNGs CENTER REP. 6 (1995).
74. The term "minor increase over minimal risk" is used, but not defined, in the por-
tion of the federal regulations dealing with children as research subjects. See 45 C.F.R.
§ 46.406(a) (1996).
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sizeable increase over minimal risk, if the agent concluded that the
patient would have wanted to participate in the protocol.
The Working Group then considered what safeguards might be
imposed in this situation. One recommendation was the use of a
"consent monitor"-someone who would meet with the agent, go over
the protocol in detail, and make certain that the agent had a clear
understanding of its relevant risks and benefits. The basis for this sug-
gestion was the concern that, in many cases, those who consent do not
fully comprehend the risks of the protocol.
The idea of a consent monitor did not originate with the Work-
ingGroup. A report by the National Commission on the Protection of
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, on research
involving those institutionalized as mentally infirm, suggested that
where appropriate, an IRB "should appoint a consent auditor to ob-
serve the consent process and determine whether each subject (I)
consents, or (II) is incapable of consenting and either assents or does
not object, or (III) objects to participation."75 The concept is also
used in the current federal regulations on research involving human
subjects. These regulations state that "[a]n IRB shall conduct contin-
uing review of research . . . at intervals appropriate to the degree of
risk, but not less than once per year, and shall have authority to ob-
serve or have a third party observe the consent process and the
research."76
Some members of the Working Group argued that the involve-
ment of a third party in the consent process was too burdensome a
requirement and would, in fact, promote a mistrust of research. One
Working Group member commented that the proposed regulations
for research on institutionalized mentally ill individuals died, in part,
because of the consent auditor provisions. Others expressed concerns
about the cost and other difficulties of implementing the concept.
Given the nature of the protocol in question, however-a signifi-
cant increase over minimal risk and no prospect of direct medical
benefit-and the relatively modest role of the monitor, the Working
Group ultimately agreed that such a mechanism was appropriate. The
members of the group made clear that they were not recommending
that the monitor be required to second-guess the decision of the
75. DeRenzo, supra note 64, at 8 (quoting the NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTEC-
TION OF HUMAN SUBJECFS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, Supra note 73, at 8).
The consent auditor, unlike the proposed consent monitor, would observe and determine
the ability of the potential research subject to consent. The consent monitor would assist
the subject's agent to understand the research protocol.
76. 45 C.F.R § 46.109(e) (1996).
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agent, but rather that the monitor would simply ensure that the agent
understood the protocol and its risks. Thus, the safeguard would be
one of process, not one of substance.
The Working Group also discussed who might serve as a "consent
monitor." One suggestion was to have a member of the institutional
ethics committee serve in this function." There was some debate
about whether a member of an ethics committee or IRB would be
most appropriate. Several Working Group participants felt that mem-
bers of the ethics committee would not be sufficiently knowledgeable
about research issues to serve competently in this capacity. Others felt
that often the IRB has too great a conflict of interest to adequately
perform this role. The debate was not ultimately settled, although the
Working Group did identify a member of an ethics committee as an
example of someone who might serve as a consent monitor.
Scenario B: Consent by a health care agent-DPA refers to health care only
This scenario focuses on an individual who has executed an ad-
vance directive designating a health care agent to make health care
decisions for the individual, but the document states nothing about
consent to participation in research. This was believed to be the far
more common scenario, because few existing advance directives in-
clude a statement regarding consent to research.
" Type of protocol: No greater than minimal risk.
" Working Group recommendation: Authorize the agent to consent
if the agent concludes that the individual would have wanted to
participate in the particular protocol, even if the investigator
can identify no reasonable prospect of direct medical benefit to
the individual.
The Working Group concluded that, although the DPA does not
address research, autonomy interests are nevertheless reflected in the
individual's decision to designate a particular person as health care
agent. Therefore, the agent's judgment about the individual's prefer-
ence for participation ought to be honored when the risks of the re-
search are minimal.
* Type of protocol: Greater than minimal risk, reasonable prospect
of direct medical benefit to the individual.
"77. In Maryland, every hospital and nursing home is required to have an ethics com-
mittee (also called patient care advisory committee) available to consult about ethical is-
sues in patient care. MD. CoDE ANN., HEAL'T-GEN. §§ 19-370 to -374 (1996). For an
argument against the use of ethics committee members in this role, see Berg, supra note 8.
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* Working Group recommendation: Authorize the agent to consent
if the agent concludes that participation would be in the indi-
vidual's medical best interest, unless there is reason to believe
that the individual would not have wanted to participate in the
particular protocol.
This recommendation preserves the existing authority of the
health care agent under the Health Care Decisions Act. When the
protocol has the prospect for direct medical benefit, the health care
agent can apply the decisional standards of the Act just as the agent
would when contemplating other health care alternatives.
A minority of the Working Group members disagreed with this
position. The minority position would prohibit an agent from con-
senting to an individual's participation in a protocol if it might subject
the individual to a significant risk of serious harm, for example, "the
risk of a marked deterioration in a previously stable psychiatric disor-
der as a result of placement in the placebo arm of a double-blind,
placebo-controlled trial.""8 This view reflected a greater concern for
the protection of vulnerable research subjects and greater skepticism
of the ability of an agent to truly exercise the autonomy of the deci-
sionally impaired individual.
There was also some discussion of restrictions that might be
placed on an agent. For example, an agent who has an affiliation with
the institution that is conducting the research might be precluded
from consenting to the individual's participation in research con-
ducted at that institution. However, no agreement on this point was.
reached.
* Type of protocol: Greater than minimal risk, no reasonable pros-
pect of direct medical benefit to the individual.
* Working Group recommendation: Authorize the agent to consent
if the agent concludes that the individual would have wanted to
participate in the particular protocol and the agent's conclu-
sion is based on direct and explicit evidence of the individual's
wish to participate, as documented in accordance with stan-
dards and procedures set by the IRB, and the protocol involves
no more than a minor increase over minimal risk.
The Working Group concluded that additional safeguards are
warranted when the individual's advance directive does not itself ad-
dress research participation. It is ethically perilous, the group ob-
served, to expose an unconsenting individual to research exceeding
minimal risk based solely on the consent of a health care agent. Yet
78. See Opinion Letter, supra note 43.
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the individual's decision to entrust a particular agent with responsibil-
ity for crucial health care decisions evidences a special regard for the
agent's judgment worthy of respect in this context as well. The Work-
ing Group's recommendation sought to balance these considerations
by requiring the agent to submit direct and explicit evidence of the
individual's wish to participate in this kind of protocol. Moreover, the
recommendation capped the risk to .which the individual would be
exposed: It is to be "no more than a minor increase over minimal
risk."
Scenario C: Surrogate consent
This scenario addresses the common case in which an individual
has not designated a health care agent, but has a family member or
friend who is authorized to make health care decisions as a
surrogate.79
" Type of protocol. No greater than minimal risk.
" Working Group recommendation: Authorize the surrogate to con-
sent if the surrogate concludes that the individual would have
wanted to participate in the particular protocol, even if the in-
vestigator can identify no reasonable prospect of direct medical
benefitto the individual.
Given the minimal level of risk, the Working Group concluded
that the surrogate's "substituted judgment"-that is, the surrogate's
conclusion that the individual would have wanted to participate in the
protocol-should be honored. When the risks are low, the surro-
gate's decision may be presumed to be a product of knowledge gained
from the family ties or other intimate links between the individual and
the surrogate.
" Type ofprotocol: Greater than minimal risk, reasonable prospect
of direct medical benefit to the individual.
" Working Group recommendation: Authorize the surrogate to con-
sent if the surrogate concludes that participation would be in
the individual's medical best interest, unless there is reason to
believe that the individual would not have wanted to partici-
pate in the particular protocol.
Given the prospect of direct medical benefit, the Working Group
decided to follow the model of the Health Care Decisions Act. The
group's recommendation generally preserves the existing authority of
the surrogate.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 37-40.
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The surrogate's authority, however, unlike that of a health care
agent, is subject to an important limitation under current Maryland
law: "A surrogate may not authorize . . . [t]reatment for a mental
disorder."' After considerable discussion, the Working Group rec-
ommended that the Act's exclusion should be modified for both
clinical and research decision-making. The group tentatively favored
a provision that would prohibit a surrogate from consenting to an indi-
vidual's admission to a mental facility, as under current law, but would
allow a surrogate to consent to most treatments for a mental disorder
(or to expected-benefit research) once an individual had been admit-
ted through the involuntary commitment process. The Working
Group proposed, however, that a surrogate not be authorized to con-
sent to "a behavior modification program involving aversive stimuli.""
The group recognized the possibility that an individual's surro-
gates, for example, adult children, might not agree whether participa-
tion in the protocol would be in the individual's "medical best
interest." The group felt that, in these circumstances, the researchers
should submit the dispute to an institution's ethics committee for a
recommendation, as is prescribed under the Health Care Decisions
Act when surrogates disagree about the course of treatment for an
incapacitated patient.8"
" Type of protocol: Greater than minimal risk, no reasonable pros-
pect of direct medical benefit to the individual.
* Working Group recommendation: Participation in the research
would not be authorized.
The Working Group concluded that reliance on the surrogate's
"substituted judgment" would be insufficient, given the absence of po-
tential for direct medical benefit and the degree of risk. Unlike an
agent, a surrogate does not carry the individual's endorsement and
implied confidence in the agent's overall judgment and feel for the
individual's presumed wishes.
Scenario D: Consent by a non-surrogate proxy-advance directive guidance
This scenario would arise where a cognitively impaired individual
does not have a guardian or anyone to act as surrogate and had not
designated a health care agent (or the designated agent was deceased
or otherwise unavailable), but had made an advance directive stating
80. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(d) (1994). The term "mental disorder" is
not defined.
81. Second Report, supra note 69, at A-12 and B-3 to B4.
82. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(b) (1994).
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his or her desire to participate in research. At present, this scenario is
more theoretical than real.
" Type of protocol: No greater than minimal risk.
" Working Group recommendation: The individual's participation in
the research may be authorized by a monitor who would make
an informed and objective decision about both enrollment and
continuing participation in the protocol. The monitor would
decide on the basis of the advance directive, other relevant in-
formation (e.g., the individual's prior participation in like re-
search), and the specific nature of the protocol.
Respect for autonomy suggested to the Working Group that an
advance directive expressly identifying the individual's desire to par-
ticipate in research ought to be honored in appropriate circum-
stances. One of these circumstances is the minimal risk posed by this
category of protocol.
The role of the monitor in this scenario would be more substan-
tive than the role of the consent monitor discussed earlier. Instead of
merely observing someone else's informed consent process, the moni-
tor here would actually make the decision."3
Given the monitor's expanded role, the Working Group was con-
cerned about the need to safeguard the monitor's objectivity. The
group concluded that the monitor, either an individual or a small
committee, must not have a stake in the-'research itself and must be
free of undue institutional constraints in performing the assigned
tasks. The Working Group reached no consensus, however, on the
degree to which the monitor must be independent of the institution
in which the research would be conducted. In one view, the monitor
ought not to be an employee of the research institution. Another
point of view was that mere employment alone was insufficient to dis-
qualify someone from the role envisioned for the monitor. The Work-
ing Group deferred for public comment and further discussion the
particular connections between the monitor and the sponsoring insti-
tution that would be too attenuated to affect the monitor's independ-
ent judgment.
* Type of protocol: Greater than minimal risk, reasonable prospect
of direct medical benefit to the individual.
* Working Group recommendation: An independent monitor may
consent to the individual's participation in the research if the
83. In its statutory recommendation, the Working Group refers to a monitor with deci-
sion-making authority as a "proxy decision-maker." See Second Report, supra note 69, at A-
4.
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monitor concludes based on the advance directive, that the in-
dividual would have wanted to participate in the particular pro-
tocol and that participation would be in the individual's
medical best interest. The monitor would have responsibility
for the individual's continued participation as well.
In the view of the Working Group, the substituted judgment and
best interest assessments required when research is of potential bene-
fit to the individual need not be made by a court. Given the potential
for benefit, protection of the individual can best be achieved through
a less formal process that nevertheless does not rely on the investiga-
tors themselves to make crucial judgments about the individual's pre-
sumed wishes or the individual's best interests. Rather, under the
proposal these responsibilities, both at the time of enrollment and
throughout the course, of the protocol, would be vested in the
monitor.
* Type of protocol: Greater than minimal risk, no reasonable pros-
pect of direct medical benefit to the individual.
" Working Group recommendation: Participation in the research
would not be authorized.
The Working Group concluded that reliance on an advance di-
rective alone under these circumstances would not be ethically justi-
fied. It is most unlikely that the document itself would have been
written with adequate knowledge of the details of a future research
protocol. Moreover, unlike the situation in which the individual's des-
ignated agent. is available to act as advocate and protector, here no
one has intimate knowledge of the individual's values and attitudes.
The bare document alone is insufficient to expose the individual to
research involving this degree of risk without the prospect of direct
medical benefit.
Scenario E: Consent by a non-surrogate proxy- no advance directive
Scenario E involves an individual who has not executed an ad-
vance directive and who has no family member or close friend author-
ized to act as surrogate.
" Type of protocol: No greater than minimal risk.
* Working Group recommendation: Participation in the research
would not be authorized unless the protocol presented a rea-
sonable prospect of direct medical benefit to the individual
and the individual's participation is authorized by a court pur-
suant to existing guardianship procedures.
In the absence of any written indication of the individual's wishes
regarding research and in the absence of anyone with intimate knowl-
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edge of the individual, the Working Group initially concluded that
research with no prospect of direct medical benefit should be ruled
out, regardless of the degree of risk. Subsequently, however, the
Working Group recognized that evidence of the individual's wishes
apart from an advance directive might be sufficient to justify participa-
tion in minimal risk research. Such participation could be authorized
by a court under traditional guardianship procedures and standards.
" Type of protocol: Greater than minimal risk, reasonable prospect
of direct medical benefit to the individual.
" Working Group recommendation: The individual's participation in
the research may be authorized by a court pursuant to existing
guardianship procedures.
Again, the Working Group concluded that traditional guardian-
ship procedures and standards should be applied.
" Type of protocol: Greater than minimal risk, no reasonable pros-
pect of direct medical benefit to the individual.
" Working Group recommendation: Participation in the research
would not be authorized.
In the Working Group's view, respect for persons absolutely pre-
cludes research participation under these circumstances.
C. Subject Assent
The Working Group's recommendations included provisions call-
ing for the assent of subjects, even when a proxy is authorized to give
consent to research participation. This concept has been incorporated
into the federal regulations applicable to research involving children.
Under these regulations, an IRB "shall determine that adequate provi-
sions are made for soliciting the assent of the children, when in the
judgment of the IRB the children are capable of providing assent."84
"Assent" is defined as "a child's affirmative agreement to participate in
research."85
The Working Group elaborated significantly on this requirement
by recommending that decisionally impaired individuals be told that
they are to participate in research and that someone else has con-
sented to their participation. 86 Furthermore, as recommended by the
Working Group, "an investigator may not compel a decisionally inca-
pacitated individual to perform an action related to the research if the
84. 45 C.F.R. § 46.408(a) (1996).
85. 45 C.F.R. § 46.402(b) (1996).
86. Second Report, supra note 69, at A-9.
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individual refuses to take the action after being asked to do so. ' ' s3
Through these means, the Working Group sought to allay concerns
about coerced research participation discussed in the T7D. case."8
IV. NEXT STEPS
The Working Group's recommendations represent an important
way-station in the state's efforts to reach agreement on this issue and
put into effect workable procedures and safeguards for the participa-
tion of decisionally impaired individuals in medical research proto-
cols. The Attorney General of Maryland, convener of the Working
Group, has emphasized the need for a broadly inclusive policy devel-
opment process. The process includes several steps: First, the Work-
ing Group's initial report, containing its preliminary policy
recommendations, was sent for comment to more than 70 research-
ers, ethicists, patient advocates, health facility administrators, and
others. These recipients were encouraged to distribute the report to
others in their respective communities. In this way, the report gained
fairly wide attention among those in Maryland and those elsewhere
who are most concerned about research with decisionally impaired
subjects.
Second, the Attorney General's Office held two public meetings
about the initial report. These were open forums, at which anyone
could ask questions or offer comments. After the public meetings, the
Working Group studied the comments and revised its initial
recommendations.
Third, the Working Group's revised recommendations, in the
form of a draft statute, were widely distributed for comments and were
critiqued at a public conference. In light of the comments, the Work-
ing Group revised the text of the proposed statute and solicited com-
ments once again. This latest draft reflects a significant restructuring
of the proposal, intended to achieve greater clarity, but does not de-
part from the Working Group's main policy recommendations.8 9
Finally, assuming that a fair degree of agreement emerges, the
Attorney General will look for legislators to sponsor the proposed leg-
islation in the Maryland General Assembly. Thus the process, with its
expanding circles of involvement-first a small working group, then
87. Id.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 21-23.
89. Jack Schwartz, Third Report of the Attorney General's Research Working Group
(August 1, 1997) (the Third Report is reprinted in the appendix to this issue of theJoumal
of Health Care Law & Policy).
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those particularly interested in biomedical research, then the public
generally and its elected representatives-will have concluded.
This process has yielded debate on a number of difficult issues.
One such issue is the Working Group's reliance on categories of risk.
The term "minimal risk," although defined in the federal regulations,
leaves much room for interpretation by an IRB and has been criti-
cized for its imprecision.9 ° One participant in discussion at a meeting,
for example, pointed out that the federal definition does not clearly
identify the perspective from which "risk" is to be assessed: that of
healthy individuals, or that of individuals with an impairment similar
to the research subject's.9" Proper regard for the welfare of subjects
might require a shift in perspective, depending on the nature of the
risk. For instance, psychological distress ought to be assessed from the
perspective of a person with a cognitive impairment; harms to dignity,
however, ought to be assessed from the perspective of a healthy
individual.
Other commentators criticized the Working Group's reliance on
gradations of risk - "minor increase over minimal risk" and "greater
than minor increase over minimal risk" - that are not clearly distin-
guishable. Federal regulations on the participation of children in
medical research use the term "minor increase over minimal risk" but
do not define it. 2 Without clarification, local IRBs will define the
terms on a case-by-case basis, leaving room for some inconsistency in
their application.93
Another issue that evoked comment is the application of a "medi-
cal best interest test" to participation in research. Conceptually it may
sometimes be difficult to apply this standard to research. In general,
when an intervention is being tested as part of a research protocol,
90. Berg, supra note 8, at 24.
91. 28 C.F.R. § 46.102 (i). The Department of Justice regulations pertaining to protec-
tion of human subjects, the definition of "minimal risk" is ambiguous. The standard in
§ 46.102(i) is "that the probability and magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the
research are not greater in and of themselves than those ordinarily encountered in daily
life or during the performance of routine physical or psychological examinations or tests."
Protections of Human Subjects, 28 C.F.R. § 46.102(i) (1997). In contrast, the definition of
the term in 45 C.F.R. § 46.303(d) (1996), the HHS regulations pertaining to research in-
volving prisoners, implies that, when the research subjects are not generally healthy (as
prisoners are presumed to be) risk is to be assessed by reference to the group of subjects,
who often will routinely experience medical interventions beyond those experienced by
healthy individuals.
92. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.404-.406 (1996).
93. In its most recent recommendations, the Working Group proposed that the Secre-
tary of Health and Mental Hygiene be authorized to issue regulations identifying the risk
of particular procedures.
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there is considerable uncertainty about its benefit or effectiveness as
compared to standard therapy. Although there is also uncertainty
about the effectiveness of an intervention in the clinical context, un-
certainty in the research setting is of a different scope and type than
in the clinical setting. In the clinical context, an intervention presum-
ably has been proven effective for some percentage of individuals.
The uncertainty relates to the effectiveness of the intervention on a
particular individual and may vary due to the individual's age, severity
of illness, other diagnoses, and the general variability of human re-
sponse to medical interventions. In the research context, the uncer-
tainty is related to whether an intervention is effective for anyone with
the particular disorder in question. Some may argue that, while the
potential benefits of the intervention in a research setting may be
wholly uncertain, there are other benefits to being part of a research
protocol that justify participation of a cognitively impaired individual.
These may include increased medical attention and better quality
medical care. Yet these "benefits" are what might better be termed
"indirect," not attributable to the intervention being tested. Should a
medical best interest test be broad enough to include such indirect
benefits, or should the test be limited to the direct benefits of the
intervention?
Also, it will be a significant challenge to apply the test to a proto-
col involving a double-blind, placebo-controlled study. While the
opinion letter of the Attorney General's office indicates that participa-
tion in such a protocol might be in the patient's best interest, 4 some
question whether a medical best interest test can everjustify participa-
tion in research where there is a probability of no benefit. On the
other hand, if standard therapy is non-existent or noxious, then the
risks associated with participation in a placebo study might be
justifiable.
Other comments addressed surrogate authorization for participa-
tion in no-expected-benefit research. A few commentators argued that
this departure from the principle of informed consent by the research
subject was not justified and posed an unacceptable risk to vulnerable
persons. Yet, other commentators criticized the Working Group for
limiting surrogate authority to minimal risk research, because the lim-
itation would inhibit important research aimed at improving under-
standing of the underlying disease process or its diagnosis.
While the Working Group's recommendations reflect concerns
of both the research community and advocates for the decisionally
94. Opinion Letter, supra note 43.
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impaired, they are limited by the experience of those on the Working
Group. With broad public participation, ideally the ultimate policy
recommendation will reflect an appropriate balance between views of
these different groups. Finally, the process and outcome may serve as
a model for other states as they take up this important issue.
